In an April 2024 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court lowered the standard of harm required of plaintiffs alleging discriminatory employment transfers in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, rejecting lower courts’ requisite “significant” harm standard.
Plaintiff Muldrow alleged that, as an employee of the St. Louis Police Department, she was subjected to sex discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment in violation of Title VII when she was transferred into a new position because she is a woman. In doing so, the Court rejected lower courts’ insistence on a showing of “significant” harm resulting from such a transfer, instead requiring only that plaintiffs show “some harm.”
After a nine-year tenure working in the St. Louis Police Department’s Intelligence Division, where she oversaw the Gang Unit and was granted FBI credentials as a Task Force Officer authorized to investigate cases outside of St. Louis, Muldrow was transferred out of the Intelligence Division by a new Captain. Muldrow had proven to be a reliable and effective member of the Intelligence Division and opposed her transfer. However, the new Captain wanted to replace her with a male officer due to the Division’s “very dangerous” work.
Muldrow’s transfer did not result in a reduction in pay or rank, though her duties became more administrative, and her schedule was no longer exclusively on weekdays. She also lost her take-home car and FBI credentials, as a non-member of the Intelligence Division.
The District Court cited precedent in the Eighth Circuit, which required Muldrow to show “significant” impact on employment conditions resulting in “material employment disadvantage,” and granted summary judgment for the Department. The trial court reasoned that, with no change in rank or pay, Muldrow’s complaint about reduced networking opportunities was “immaterial” and, because she continued as a supervisor, had not endured a “significant” change in her duties. The court described Muldrow’s schedule complaints as “minor” and not material harms. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan stated that nowhere in the text of Title VII is there a requirement that employees show “significant” harm from a discriminatory transfer to proceed with a claim. Instead, Title VII requires a showing of discriminatory treatment, or “worse” treatment because of a protected trait (like sex), with respect to employment terms and conditions. Muldrow must “show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” (emphasis added).
The Court rejected the City of St. Louis’s argument that, because the “otherwise discriminate” language in Title VII followed terms—refusing to hire or discharging—that involve significant disadvantages, “otherwise discriminate” should be read to include equal levels of harm. The Court also disagreed with the City’s reliance on precedent involving the anti-retaliation provision’s requirement of “materially adverse” employment action, as well as its judicial economy argument that the courts would be overwhelmed with frivolous transfer lawsuits if the Court eliminated the “significant” test.
Instead, Justice Kagan wrote that Muldrow showed the “some injury” required in her pleading. “Recall her principal allegations. She was moved from a plainclothes job in a prestigious specialized division giving her substantial responsibility over priority investigations and frequent opportunity to work with police commanders. She was moved to a uniformed job supervising one district’s patrol officers . . . Her schedule became less regular, often requiring her to work weekends; and she lost her take-home car. . . . It does not matter . . . that her rank and pay remained the same, or that she still could advance to other jobs.”
Source: Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 144 S.Ct. 967 (2024)